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Zoran Bubaš 
 
Government Finances in 2000: On the Way to the 
End of the Tunnel or Just Round the  
Roundabout?  
 
The Deficit of the National Budget 
According to data of the Croatian National Bank and 
the Finance Ministry, August was the seventh 
successive month in which the balance of revenue 
and expenditure in the national Budget was in the red.   
Both general public and professional circles found the 
news about the extent of the monthly level of the 
deficit in July rather alarming.  It came to as much as 
1,367 billion kuna, a rise of 22% over June.  
According to the Finance Ministry, the reasons for 
this kind of rise in the deficit in July can be found, in 
the main, in capital expenditure, the payment of 
subsidies and the payment of interest for the internal 
public debt.  These obligations, it is explained, arise at 
regular intervals, for example, in the middle of the 
financial year.  This is confirmed by the data for 
August and September, when the overall deficit in the 
Budget considered in monthly terms came to 655 
million and 351 million kuna respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1. The total deficit/surplus of the national Budget at a monthly level in 2000 
        Source: Ministry of Finance, RC 
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Realisation of the Revenue of the National Budget  
 
On the revenue side of the national Budget, a fall of 
current revenue (which consists 95% of taxation 
revenue) was recorded in July, it being 0.5% lower 
than in the same period the preceding year.  
However, when August and September are compared 
with the same months for 1999, the national Budget 
records a rise in current revenue of 5.5% and 2.3%.  
In the first nine months of this year current revenue 
was 3.3% greater than in the same period last year, 
which is to be attributed to better yields from VAT 
and excise.      
The taxes that during the first nine months of this 
year were lower than in the previous year are mainly 
profits tax, income tax and customs duties.  
Considering the general economic picture and the 
operations of the government in fiscal policy, this 
cannot be considered an unexpected phenomenon.    
What can, on the revenue side of the national Budget 
in this year, be considered unexpected is the non-
delivery of revenue from capital, that is, the sums 
planned to be realised from the sale of HT (Croatian 
Telecom). 
 
Table 1. Total revenue of the national Budget (in %) 
 VIII. 2000. 
VIII. 1999. 
IX. 2000. 
IX. 1999. 
I. - IX. 2000. 
I. - IX. 1999. 
I. – IX. 2000. 
Plan 2000. 
I. Total revenue (II+V) 105.6  102.3 113.0 70.4  
II. Current revenue (III+IV) 105.5  102.3 103.3 77.9  
III. Taxation revenue 107.8  101.2 104.1 78.1  
Composed of:     
a) income tax 85.0  86.4 93.8 91.2  
b) profits tax 61.6  69.3 72.6 65.7  
c) VAT 123.6  99.1 108.2 77.5  
d) excise taxes 115.6  141.8 126.3 81.4  
e) taxes on international trade 75.8  80.1 91.3 73.2  
IV. Non-tax revenue 57.6  123.8 85.9 74.6  
V. Revenue from capital 121.8  109.2 1561.0 35.9                       
Source: Finance Ministry, RC. 
 
 
A look at consolidated central government: 
where the source of the deficit is. 
 
A much better insight into the state of public finances 
is afforded by the figures for consolidated central 
government, since as well as the national Budget, they 
cover the extra-budgetary funds.  According to the 
Ministry of Finance, consolidated central 
government had a 1.81 billion kuna deficit in the 
first half year, while for the whole of 2000 a 
consolidated central government deficit of only 
2.4 billion kuna was planned.  In other words, in 
the first six months of the year, more than 75% of 
the entire planned consolidated central 
government deficit for the year was used up. If 
one starts out from the rather optimistic assumption 
that the picture of revenue and expenditure of 
consolidated central government will not be 
essentially different from that of the first half, then 
the total deficit of consolidated central government 
will be somewhere in the range of 4 and 5 billion 
kuna.  A slightly less optimistic, and hence more 
realistic, projection, in which the rise of current 
revenues over the planned level is cancelled out by 
the failure of capital-derived revenue to appear, 
points to a consolidated central government 
deficit of around 6 billion kuna, or 3.8% of GDP, 
in 2000.  
 
Available figures about consolidated central 
government warn that the generator of the deficit 
of central government is not the Budget, but the 
extra-budgetary funds.  While during the first six 
months, the national Budget recorded a surplus of 
about 5 billion kuna in the consolidated balance 
sheet, the extra-budgetary funds had a loss of almost 
7 billion kuna.   About 6 billion kuna, or 88.6% of the 
entire consolidated deficit of the extra-budgetary 
funds in the first six months of 2000, were accounted 
for by the Retirement and Health Insurance Institutes 
(Funds). 
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Table 2: The balance of consolidated central government according to levels of government. 
 Plan  
2000. 
Realisation 
I. – VI. 2000. 
Realisation 
I. – VII. 2000. 
I. Total deficit / surplus (II. + III.)  -2,400,190  -1,809,994  -4,124,665  
II. National Budget  9,838,081   5,055,169   4,932,901  
III. Extra-budgetary funds  -12,238,271  -6,865,163  -9,057,566  
     Composed of:    
     Retirement Insurance Fund -7,819,693  -4,288,293  -5,075,679  
     Health Insurance Fund -2,473,594  -1,796,773  -3,070,496  
        
NB: Balance calculated as (total revenue and grants) minus (total expenditure and loans minus repayments.  
                     Source Ministry of Finance, RC 
 
Some 5.2 billion kuna were planned for the 
Retirement Insurance Institute, 1.766 billion kuna for 
the Health Insurance Institute, 17.6 million kuna for 
the Employment Institute, 1.132 billion kuna for the 
Child Benefit Fund, and 388.7 million kuna for 
Croatian Water PC.  If these sums are combined, 
together with planned transfers to local government, 
the result is planned transfers to other levels of 
government coming to a total of 8.63 billion kuna. 
However, during the first nine months of the 
execution of the Budget, 8.19 billion kuna were 
transferred to other levels of government, or on 
average about 910 million kuna per month. 
 
Table 3: Transfers to other levels of government from the national Budget in 2000 
 Plan  
2000. 
Realisation 
I. – IX. 
2000. 
Average 
I. – IX. 
2000. 
Projection 
2000. 
I. Transfers to other levels of government (II.+III.)     8,628,470  8,191,716  910,191  10,922,288  
II. Transfers to the extra-budgetary funds 8,424,726  - - - 
III. Transfers to local government    203,744  - - - 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, RC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If for the period from October to December 
2000 one makes a conservative (optimistic!) 
assumption that the monthly transfers to other 
levels of government will be equivalent to at least 
the average monthly amount, then the planned 
expenditure of the national Budget for this item 
for 2000 has to be adjusted by about 2.3 billion 
kuna. In other words, with the optimistic 
assumption that all other items of expenditure 
remain within the plan, transfers to other levels of 
government will increase the total deficit of the 
national Budget for 2000 from a planned 1.27 
billion kuna to about 3.6 billion kuna.  Part of the 
budgetary deficit will be palliated by better tax 
revenue, but when one puts into the equation the 
loss of planned revenue from capital because of 
the postponement of HT privatisation, one 
comes to the conclusion that when the bottom 
line is drawn on the national Budget on 
December 31 2000, it is almost impossible to 
imagine it being in the red less than 6.3 billion 
kuna, or 4% of GDP.1 
Borrowing: the price of the Croatian cure, or 
the consequences of the sickness 
 
Since the deficit of the national Budget and of 
consolidated central government does not fall within 
the planned framework, and with very reasonable 
doubt about the manoeuvring space for 
redistribution, the major part of the burden of the 
rebalance of 2000 will have to be borne by the 
financing account. In other words, after the 
establishment of the new planned level of revenue 
and expenditure, the gap between them will be 
covered by additional government borrowing.  From 
a comparison of data from the CNB about the debt 
of the central government from the end of 1999 and 
June 2000, it can be seen that the total debt of 
central government has risen by about 4 billion kuna. 
Of this, about 50% relates to an increase in the 
internal public debt, and the second half to an 
increase in the external public debt; the total debt of 
central government at the end of June  came to 50.5 
billion kuna, or about 32% of total anticipated GDP 
for 2000. 
1  With respect to resources borrowed against future revenue from the sales of HT shares,  this is actually a bridging loan between this year's need for resources and the value of the assets being 
sold.  How much money will really be obtained from the sale of the shares in HT remains to be seen, for this does not  depend on  government calculations, only on the financial market.  
Although the sales of the HT shares should cancel out the loan of  5 billion kuna, statistics for the end of this fiscal year should show these 5 billion under the heading of the growth of public debt. 
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Table 4: Central government debt 
(million kuna, end of period) XII. 1999. VI. 2000. 
Internal debt of central government 16,782.2 17,564.3 
External debt of central government 29,843.6 33,010.7 
Total  46,625.8 50,575.0                                        
Sou rce: CNB 
 
In the light of the expected deficit it can be 
assumed that there will be a rise in the ratio of 
borrowing-to-GDP to 35% and more.  
Nevertheless, the level of the public debt of the 
Republic of Croatia is not necessarily alarming when 
compared with that in other European countries, or 
indeed the Maastricht criteria for entry into the EMU. 
However the fact that should give decision-makers 
pause for thought is that the foreign debt accounts 
for almost two thirds of the public debt of the 
Republic of Croatia. 
 
 
Figure 2: The proportion of external debt of central government in the total central government debt between 1996   
and 2000 (end of period) 
                          
                               NB: For 2000, the situation as of the end of June is quoted 
                                                        Source: CNB 
 
 
 
But when one broadens the framework of 
indebtedness from just the public sector so as to 
include all the foreign borrowings of the whole of the 
national economy, the causes for concern grow (apart 
from  government or public sector debt, this includes 
the borrowings of banks, firms and the retail sector).  
With a total external debt of $9.9 billion (as of the 
end of June), and an expected GDP of $19.146 
billion in 2000, the burden that the total foreign 
debt places upon current economic activity 
comes to about 50 per cent.  For the sake of 
comparison, the boundary value, above which the risk 
of insolvency  grows, that is, above which there is a 
growing danger of the medicine turning into poison, is 
considered to be the ratio of  total foreign debt to 
GDP of about 30%.  
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Figure 3: Proportion of total external debt of the national economy in GDP from 1996 to 2000 (end of period). 
                                 NB: For 2000, the situation as of the end of June is quoted. 
           Source: CNB     
 
 
 
 
Finally, the inevitable conclusion arises: although expenditure for pay and contributions will explain about a 
third of the total expenditure of the national Budget, solutions for the problems of public expenditure have to 
be sought in reforms of the system of retirement and health insurance. Rationalisation in the civil service, and 
the nominal pay ceiling can, for example, have a relatively rapid effect, reducing the share of government 
salaries in overall budgetary expenditure.  The same goes for the companies in which the state has majority 
holdings and in which, after privatisation, the new owners and the market will determine who will be paid, and 
how much. Apart from that, deferment of the radical reforms of the system of retirement and health insurance 
is nothing but a policy of waiting until the water level arises to the level of the taxpayer's ears. The question 
also arises of the policy of the public debt, and the management of the public debt from which this policy has 
to derive: the essential difference between private and public borrowing is that the advantages or damage that 
may arise as a result of public sector borrowing affect all citizens, even those, what is more, who have not yet 
been born. There is not much space in Croatia to wait for better times to make and put into practice the 
necessary decisions, because the future is tightly linked, in terms of cause and effect, with today's choices. From 
this point of view, to transfer funds obtained by borrowing or the sale national assets at the moment of 
consumption is not even to maintain the status quo.  
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